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Abstract
Sometimes retracted or thoroughly refuted scientific information is used and propagated
long after it is understood to be misleading. Likewise, sometimes retracted news items spread
and persist, even after it has been publicly established that they are false. In this paper,
we use agent-based models of epistemic networks to explore the dynamics of retraction. In
particular, we focus on why false beliefs might persist, even in the face of retraction. We find
that in many cases those who have received false information simply fail to receive retractions
due to social dynamics. Surprisingly, we find that in some cases delaying retraction may
increase its impact. We also find that retractions are most successful when issued by the
original source of misinformation, rather than a separate source.
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1. Introduction
Over the course of a decade, Scott S. Reuben, an influential American anaesthesiologist,
published a series of articles examining the role of cyclooxygenase-2 specific inhibitors in
controlling post-operative pain following orthopaedic surgery (Buckwalter et al., 2015). In
2010, though, Reuben was convicted of fraud for accepting grants from drug companies to
perform clinical trials, but then fabricating the data and publishing ‘results’ without having
conducted trials.1 An investigation determined that at least 21 of Reuben’s articles contained
fabricated data; all of these articles were subsequently retracted (Shafer, 2015).
Before retraction, the articles had collectively obtained nearly 1200 citations. By 2014,
however, a case study found that roughly half of these articles continued to be cited con-
sistently, and only 1/4 of the citing articles clearly stated that Reuben’s work had been
retracted (Bornemann-Cimenti et al., 2016). It seems remarkable that scientific findings of
this sort would be so widely used in the literature after being withdrawn as fraudulent, but
this is by no means an isolated case. Studies of retracted results have found that they are
often widely cited after retraction. Moreover, Cor and Sood (2018) find that 91% of these
post-retraction citations are approving of the original research.2
In this paper, we examine how false information perpetuates, even in light of correction.
To explore the dynamics of retraction, we develop agent-based models where actors on
networks share and spread beliefs. Our models make the following, fundamental assumption:
there is an asymmetry in the way a new finding spreads versus a retracted one. While
individuals are apt to share novel information, they only tend to share retractions when the
topic of conversation already centres on the false information. This assumption is consistent
with Grice’s maxim of relation that, in conversation, one should be relevant (Grice, 1975).
In our models, false beliefs can take a long time to eliminate after retraction. Additionally,
1Reuben pled guilty on 22 February 2010, and was sentenced to six months imprisonment; see Mas-
sachusetts (2010).
2See also Budd et al. (1998); Neale et al. (2010).
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we find that whenever information gets old, in the sense that individuals stop sharing infor-
mation after some time frame, false beliefs can persist indefinitely even when a retraction is
issued. This occurs without any biased reasoning—we assume that any individual exposed
to a retraction will change their mind. The persistence of false beliefs is a direct result of
the fact that some individuals who received false beliefs from their neighbours happen never
to receive a retraction.
Additionally, we consider the conditions under which retractions are more or less success-
ful. We find there can be unexpected interactions between how long a retraction is delayed
and how effective it is. In particular, a retraction that is introduced later—i.e., once a false
belief is held widely—may be more efficacious, because it is relevant to a greater number of
individuals. We also explore how network structure influences these processes. We examine
small-world networks and preferential-attachment networks to see what effect the location
of a retraction has on its success and find that retractions are more successful when issued
from the original source. Additionally, we show that homophily—i.e., disproportionate in-
group communication—can slow the spread of a retraction, especially if it is introduced in
a subgroup where the false belief is not widely-held.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we give an overview of relevant literature and
introduce the modelling framework upon which this paper draws. In section 3, we present
the simplest model explored here and describe its fundamental behaviour. Sections 3.2, 3.3,
and 3.4 extend these results to several different scenarios intended to tease out the dynamics
of retraction. Section 4 concludes.
2. Retraction and Contagion
As we have seen, retraction of a scientific paper does not always work the way it should.
There are two things we should distinguish here. First is whether articles are cited after
retraction, and second is whether scientists continue to hold beliefs now known to be false.
3
Our models actually consider the second question: how might false beliefs persist in the face
of retraction/refutation of a result? However, the empirical literature focuses on citations,
rather than underlying beliefs. Given scientific norms against citing known falsehoods, we
take this literature to provide evidence (albeit imperfect) about false beliefs in the face of
retraction.
Papers typically are retracted due to error, fraud, or failure to replicate (Wager and
Williams, 2011; Steen, 2011; Fang et al., 2012), and retractions have become increasingly
common (Cokol et al., 2008; Grieneisen and Zhang, 2012; Steen et al., 2013; Madlock-Brown
and Eichmann, 2015). Importantly, study after study has found that even after retraction,
papers continue to be cited, sometimes for years (Pfeifer and Snodgrass, 1990; Budd et al.,
1998; Cor and Sood, 2018; Van Der Vet and Nijveen, 2016; Madlock-Brown and Eichmann,
2015). Some studies find declines in citation rate after retraction, others no change, or even
an increase in citation rate (Cor and Sood, 2018; Van Der Vet and Nijveen, 2016; Madlock-
Brown and Eichmann, 2015).
There is another, relevant kind of retraction which occurs in the news media. This often
involves issuing an erratum or apology concerning a specific claim instead of retracting
an entire article or report. There is little data about the effects of news-media retraction
on belief. However, in many cases claims continue to spread widely after media retraction.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, claims that the virus strips hemoglobin of iron
were tweeted thousands of times after the Medium article originating them was removed.
We do not claim here that retraction in science and retraction in media are just the same,
but we think that many cases from both arenas can be captured by the models we develop.
Our models draw on the network-contagion modelling paradigm.3 These models are
widely used to represent the spread of both disease and belief (Hayhoe et al., 2017). The
idea is that just as infections spread to susceptible individuals, in some cases beliefs spread
3Contagion models are a type of diffusion model (Rogers, 2012). See discussion in Levy and Nail (1993).
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in social networks from those who hold them to those who do not.
There is an extensive literature on social-contagion models to which it would be impos-
sible to do justice here. Nonetheless, the basic idea is simple. We use network models where
the nodes are individuals (scientists, journalists, members of the public), and the vertices
are communication channels between them. False information can spread from individual to
individual. Information about a retraction can also spread; though, as we outline below, we
assume there is an asymmetry in how false reports and retractions spread.4
Of course, not all beliefs are well-modelled as contagions. These models are best tuned
to beliefs that spread unit-like from person to person and are easily adopted. In many cases,
individuals depend on evidence to form beliefs in a rational or semi-rational way and can hold
graded degrees of belief. This is especially true in scientific communities, where beliefs are
expected to be evidence-based. (For this reason, philosophers of science have more often used
the network-epistemology framework to represent the spread of scientific beliefs (Zollman,
2013; Goldman and O’Connor, 2019).)
What cases, then, are appropriate targets of the investigation here? The models apply
to cases where beliefs are adopted relatively unreflectively. For instance, scientists may trust
free-standing claims published by peers—e.g., that a particular hormone causes hunger or
that a drug effectively reduces pain. Media consumers may trust journalists who claim there
is a fire in some city, that Moonstruck is a great movie, or that SARS-CoV-2 strips iron
from hemoglobin. In cases of beliefs that are controversial or that depend upon background
theory, so that individuals engage in calculation or reasoning before adopting them, the
models will be less applicable. Additionally, the models will apply best in cases where re-
tractions/refutations are apparent—i.e., where it becomes uncontroversial that the original
claim is, in fact, false.
4At least one previous paper—Hui et al. (2011)—has used a contagion-type network model to investigate
the dynamics of retracted information. However, they assume their misinformed agents exit the network,
rather than continuing to share information, which makes these models a poor fit to most real-world cases.
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3. Model and Results
In this section, we present a base model and results. We also examine variations on this
foundation to obtain a clearer picture of the dynamics of false and retracted information.
Suppose we have a population of N individuals. Each has a belief about the world,
contingent on information they have received. In particular, we consider false information,
representing an erroneous or fraudulent scientific finding, or a misleading news item, and also
retracted (or corrected) information. Individuals can thus have three belief states: neutral
(before receiving any information), false (having received false information), and true or
retracted (having received the retraction).
We start simulations with the majority of the population holding neutral beliefs. One
individual holds a false belief. A retraction is introduced to one individual either at the start
of the simulation or after some number of rounds. At each time step, we pair two network
neighbours at random to interact. This is done by randomly selecting a focal individual and
then randomly selecting a partner from their neighbours.5
Beliefs spread as follows. If one individual holds the false belief and the other a neutral
belief, we assume the false belief always spreads. The idea is that the individuals pass on
new information per the contagion framework discussed in Section 2. Retracted beliefs also
spread in this way, but only to those who already hold the false belief. As mentioned in the
introduction, this captures the idea that sharing some novel, albeit false, information is more
apt than sharing a retraction of that same information, because a retraction is parasitic on
the context. It is only interesting or relevant to those who already hold false beliefs. We
might alternatively interpret the model in the following way: if one individual mentions a
5Many models of network contagion/diffusion assume a probabilistic flow of opinion that happens be-
tween each new adopter and all their neighbours—i.e., node M adopts an opinion in round t, and with
probability 0.3 all her neighbours will adopt that opinion in t1. We instead assume probabilistic pairings
and a deterministic flow of information when these pairings happen. We still take our model to fall under
the umbrella of this framework since, unlike other epistemic-network models, we do not represent evidence
or complex belief states.
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false belief to a partner who knows it has been retracted, the partner will then share the
retraction. (To be clear, there are cases not well captured by these models where retractions
are of interest independent of initial findings.)
3.1. Complete Network
We begin with a population connected in a complete network, as in Figure 1. This means
every agent is eligible for pairing with the focal individual on every given round. (We might
also describe this as a population without a network, where individuals meet randomly for
interaction.) When, after some time step, no further belief-revision can occur, we say that the
Figure 1: A complete network, with a population of N = 10 agents.
population is in a stable state. For a model of this sort, of any size, several population states
are stable. For all of these, it is the case that no individual in the population holds a false
belief. In other words, for the model to be in a stable state, every individual must hold either
neutral or retracted information. This fact actually holds of a broader set of networks—those
that are connected (meaning there is a path between every pair of nodes). Intuitively, this
occurs because the retraction can spread to all individuals with the false belief, but not
to individuals with a neutral belief. Since all individuals are connected, eventually each
individual with a false belief will pair with someone holding the retraction and end up with
the true belief. Either all members of the network are exposed to the false belief, and end
up, eventually, with the true belief; or else, some of them never see the false belief, and at
the end will have neutral beliefs that are stable because there are no false beliefs left in the
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network.
Proposition 1. For any connected network, a population configuration is stable if and only
if no individual holds a false belief.
Proof. See appendix A.
Furthermore, the population will always converge toward one of these stable states given
enough time. This fact is stated in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. For a connected network, in the limit, the population configuration always
reaches a stable state.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Proposition 1.
Since the long-term fate of false belief is reasonably predictable, in the sense just outlined,
for now, we are interested in the ‘medium-run’ results. How long does false information
persist in this set-up? How widely does it spread? How do alterations influence this process?
To answer these questions, we run simulations.6
We examine populations of N = 10, 50, 100, 1000 individuals. In each case, one individual
from the population is given false information, and one the retraction, at the outset. Simu-
lations proceed round by round. Reported results are averages across simulations.7 In each
case, the population converges to a stable configuration (as expected). The typical behaviour
of the model involves first the spread of the false belief, sometimes saturating the population
(or coming close), and subsequently the spread of the retraction until all individuals hold
6The simulations are run using the Mesa agent-based modelling framework in Python3. See
https://github.com/projectmesa. The code for our simulations is publicly available at [removed for re-
view].
7We average the results of 1000, 1000, 1000, and 100 episodes, respectively, for networks of size 10, 50, 100,
and 1000. In the largest population, simulations take longer to run. For this reason, we mostly focus on results
from smaller populations where we can gather more data. Throughout, we ran each simulation long enough
to reach a stable state
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true or neutral beliefs. In figure 2, we can see this process for three population sizes. The
x-axis tracks time (note the different time scales), and the y-axis tracks the proportion of
the population in the three possible belief states.
(a) N = 10 (b) N = 50
(c) N = 1000
Figure 2: Simulation results for a population on a complete network. N is the size of the
population.
There are a few things to notice. A group of 10 individuals sees, on average, 40% of the
population holding false beliefs at some point. When we increase the population to 1000
individuals, this becomes 90%. In other words, for a larger population, on average, false
beliefs spread further. This is because, for smaller networks, the false belief is easier to nip
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in the bud. Though the proportion of individuals holding retracted and false beliefs at the
outset are the equivalent for a given population size (10% of the population for N = 10
and 0.1% of the population for N = 1000), for smaller networks, it is more likely that
early pairings bring all those with the false belief in contact with the retraction.8 For similar
reasons, there appears to be a strong, positive relationship between the size of the population
and the average length of time (number of time steps) for which an agent holds her false
belief, as is evident in figure 3.
Figure 3: Length of time false beliefs are held for populations of different sizes. For larger
populations, false beliefs are held longer on average.
These observations could be outlined analytically, given that pairings are based solely
on probability distributions for the complete network—i.e., they depend entirely upon how
many individuals hold each type of belief at a given time step and how large the population
is. While the results here are perhaps unsurprising, we now extend this model by looking at
some variations.
8By way of example, at the outset of a simulation with N = 10, the false belief is an order of magnitude
more likely to spread than the retraction. In contrast, for N = 1000, the false belief is three orders of
magnitude more likely to spread than the retraction.
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Delayed Retraction
We assume in the base model that the false information and the retraction enter the network
at the outset of an episode. This assumption is perhaps accurate with something like real-
time fact-checking during a political debate; however, in the case of replication and retraction
of scientific studies, there is usually a (potentially significant) delay before the retraction
enters into the population. For instance, Fang et al. (2012) find that it takes an average of
three years for a finding to be retracted. In some cases, the discovery of fraud can trigger
retraction of an author’s older articles, including ones published many years previously.
We delay the introduction of retracted information by a parameter, delay. Otherwise,
the simulations are run as before. The delay generally tends to increase the number of
individuals who ever hold the false belief. It also increases the average amount of time
individuals hold false beliefs. However, for relatively short delays, there is little impact on
the average time false beliefs are held. This is shown in figure 4. As is apparent, for N = 100
there is virtually no change for delay ≤ 200. This is because if a retraction is issued when
relatively few individuals hold the false belief, it spreads very slowly, since few individuals
will take it up. If it is issued once false beliefs have saturated the community, each interaction
is one where the retraction will spread, so it catches on more quickly. As we will see later
in the paper, this means that, perhaps surprisingly, under some conditions, later retractions
are successful.
Timed Novelty
We also previously assumed that agents share information indefinitely. However, in many
cases new information is more readily shared than old. We model this as follows. Each
agent—upon receiving novel (false or retracted) information—only shares it for a specified
time frame. This small, realistic change means that the analytic results in Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 no longer hold. Now false information may stably persist. This happens when
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Figure 4: As retractions are delayed, false beliefs are held for a longer time on average. For
short delays, there is relatively little effect. N = 100
enough time has passed that no one shares the retraction, even though some individuals in
the network hold false beliefs.
As before, in each case, we give one individual from the population false information
and one individual the correction. Figure 5 shows results for population size N = 100.9
The x-axis tracks time, and the y-axis tracks the average belief state of the population over
simulations.
As is apparent, when the window for which individuals share beliefs is long, simulations
are much like the previous models (Figure 5a). The false belief spreads and then is supplanted
by the true belief. As the sharing window gets shorter, though, false beliefs start to persist
alongside retracted beliefs because the retraction is no longer shared (Figures 5b, 5c). As
the window grows shorter still, the retraction does not spread at all, and only false and
neutral beliefs persist (Figures 5d, 5e). For the shortest time windows, neither belief spreads
9Results are qualitatively similar for N = 50, 1000. Because the population is so small when N = 10,
the behaviour of the model is slightly different, but with timed novelty, false beliefs can persist indefinitely
in this model as well.
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(a) Time frame = 400 (b) Time frame = 300 (c) Time frame = 200
(d) Time frame = 100 (e) Time frame = 75 (f) Time frame = 25
Figure 5: Simulation results for the model with timed novelty on a complete network with
a population of N = 100 individuals.
(Figure 5f). In other words, there is a regime of moderate sharing where false beliefs are
common at the end of a simulation.
Why do we see these effects? For the false information to begin to spread in the first
place, the individual holding the false belief must be chosen within the early rounds before
they stop sharing. Since there are 100 individuals in the population, each equally likely to
be picked on a given round, the agent holding the false information has a reasonably low
probability of being chosen within a short frame of time. It is harder still for the retraction
to spread since this requires that the individual with the retracted belief be selected in the
first rounds, and also meet a neighbour with the false belief.
Since false beliefs are stable in these models we can ask: under different regimes, what
proportion of the population ends up with a false belief? Figure 6 shows the qualitative trend
visible in figure 5. Each colour band represents the average proportion of individuals at that
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end state for some time frame of belief-sharing. As the time frame grows, neutral beliefs
decrease, the proportion of stable false beliefs grows and then shrinks, and the proportion
of retracted beliefs grows.10
Figure 6: As sharing time increases, false beliefs become more prevalent and then less preva-
lent. N = 100, delay = 0
We have been discussing independent variations to the base model, but there are inter-
action effects between these parameters. In particular, a delayed retraction can interact with
timed novelty in the following way. When there is only one individual with false information
and one individual with retracted information, on any given round, there is a minuscule
probability that the retracted information can spread. However, if almost everyone in the
population already holds a false belief, this probability is much higher. We have already seen
that a delay in retraction does not necessarily lead to a significant increase in average length
of false belief, for this reason. However, in some cases, a delay in retraction can actually
10Reported results to this point have been averages over simulations. However, in these models, there is
significant variation in the level of false belief at the end of runs for particular sets of parameter values. For
some runs, the false belief will gain traction, while for others, it may never spread at all. For some runs,
the retraction will spread widely due to an accident of history, and for others, the retraction does not reach
many individuals. This means that some information is lost in the data we have presented so far. This is
especially true for longer time frames.
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improve belief because a population where the false belief is widely held will be more recep-
tive to the retraction. It can catch on like a contagion. Figure 7 shows this. As the delay
increases, we see a decrease in the final number of false beliefs because the delay makes the
retraction relevant during the time frame where individuals are sharing it.
Figure 7: For a fixed sharing time frame of 200, as the delay in retraction increases, final
false beliefs decrease, and retracted beliefs increase. N = 100
3.2. Small-World Networks
To this point, we have considered a trivial network structure which assumes every individual
meets every other randomly. But some scientists are regular communicators, and others do
not interact at all. We can vary network structure to restrict the individuals with whom any
particular agent can share information—two agents are eligible for pairing just in case they
are connected.
We consider small-world networks because many real-world social networks exhibit small-
world properties (Telesford et al., 2011). Small-world networks are defined by short average
path-length—i.e., the distance between any pair of nodes is relatively short—and high clus-
tering coefficients. The clustering coefficient is a measure of how dense the connections are
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for individual nodes: If your friends are all friends with one another, then you have a high
clustering coefficient. Small-world networks also tend to have hubs, which are nodes with
higher-than-average connections—e.g., a popular individual at the centre of a clique is a
‘hub’ for social interactions.11
We generate networks according to the Watts-Strogatz model (Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
The algorithm begins with a network with N nodes, each of which connects to its K nearest
neighbours. Then, for every node, ni, it takes every edge connecting ni to its K/2 rightmost
neighbours and re-wires it with probability p. Rewiring is done such that the new link
connects (ni, nk), where k is chosen at random, subject to the constraints that there are no
loops, and no duplications. We examine models with (k, p) = (8, 0.1), (16, 0.07), (32, 0.016).12
Figure 8 shows an example of a regular lattice, a small-world network, and a random network.
As the figure makes clear, the small-world network is related to both of these. The more
rewiring in the algorithm, the further the network is from a lattice, and the closer to the
random network. Small worlds exist for intermediate values between these extremes.
With a non-trivial network structure, we must now specify the relationship between
the source of the false belief and the source of the retraction. They might originate at
the same node. This captures a situation in which, e.g., a specific individual (lab, journal,
institute) publishes a result and then subsequently retracts it. Alternatively, a retraction
might originate at a different node if another journal or lab publishes a failure to replicate,
or if one news outlet invalidates another’s claim.
The qualitative results from our base model hold for small worlds. We discuss simulations
for N = 100. When individuals never stop sharing information, the only stable states are
11Note that small-world networks generally display an over-abundance of hubs compared to real-world
networks. The preferential-attachment networks considered in the next section do not.
12The parameters for k were chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but they correspond to an individual, on
average, knowing between 1/10 and 1/3 of the population. Once we decided upon these values for k, we
empirically tested a variety of values for p and calculated the ‘small-worldness’ of the resultant network
using the ω measure described in Telesford et al. (2011). The values we chose consistently achieved ω close
to zero.
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(a) lattice (b) small world (c) random
Figure 8: Particular instances of (a) a lattice network, (b) a small-world network, and (c)
a random network. In each case, the population consists of 50 individuals, and the average
degree for each node is 8.
ones in which there are no false beliefs. Delaying the introduction of retracted information
again tends to increase the average amount of time individuals hold false beliefs. As before,
when we introduce timed novelty to our model, stable false beliefs are possible. And as
before, delay can create a surprising benefit in such cases.
Does the location of a retraction influence its success? We looked at simulations where the
retraction was either introduced 1) by the same agent who introduced the false belief or 2) by
another, random agent in the network. We find that introducing the retraction in a different
spot leads to more, stable false belief (assuming there is some time frame for sharing). Figure
9 shows this for a particular model. This happens because the retraction, when introduced
in the same location, can chase and overtake false beliefs.13 When introduced in another
location, it takes longer for the retraction and false beliefs to come into contact, and thus
the false belief is harder to eradicate. As we will discuss in the conclusion, this may have
important policy implications for journals.
13Notice that for the model where the same agent issues the retraction, increasing delay first slightly
increases false belief and then decreases it. This is because when the retraction is issued right away, there
may be no time for the false belief to spread at all. So, there are few false beliefs. But when the delay
continues to increase, it improves the uptake of the retraction.
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Figure 9: False beliefs are less prevalent when the same source issues a retraction, N =
100, K = 8, time frame for sharing = 200.
3.3. Preferential-Attachment Networks
As noted, small-world networks accord with some empirically observed properties of so-
cial networks. However, unlike small-world networks, many real-world networks have been
observed to have scale-free properties such that some small number of individuals are very
highly connected, while most are not.14 In particular, scale-free properties are common in ci-
tation networks, scientific collaboration networks, and on the internet (Baraba´si and Albert,
1999; Baraba´si et al., 2002; Albert and Baraba´si, 2002; Steyvers and Tenenbaum, 2005).15
This might correspond, for instance, to scientific communities where some individuals are
highly connected, and others are marginally so.
We now look at networks generated according to the Baraba´si–Albert preferential-attachment
model (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999). The algorithm begins with a connected network of m in-
dividuals. New nodes (up to N) are added one at a time. Each connects to m existing nodes
with probability directly proportional to the number of links the nodes already have. There-
14In a scale-free network, the asymptotic degree distribution follows a power law.
15Though the scale-free nature of some networks has been contested; see Clauset et al. (2007); Milojevic´
(2010); Broido and Clauset (2019).
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fore, existing nodes with many links tend to receive more new attachments, e.g., new articles
are proportionally more likely to cite ‘famous’ (already heavily cited) articles rather than
newer articles with fewer citations. Figure 10 shows an example of networks for m = 1, 3, 5.
We examine networks with m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
(a) m = 1 (b) m = 3 (c) m = 5
Figure 10: Example of preferential-attachment networks.
Our results are generally robust in these new networks. Timed novelty can lead to the
indefinite persistence of false beliefs, and delayed retraction can sometimes improve the sat-
uration of a retraction. As with small-world networks, for preferential-attachment networks,
we can ask: how does the location of retraction influence outcomes? We were particularly
interested in cases where a founding, central node introduced a false result. We then looked
at treatments where either 1) the retraction was introduced by this same node, or 2) the
last node introduced the retraction. This might correspond to situations where either a
well-established scientist retracts their own finding, or where a relative newcomer to the
community refutes them.
We found that, across parameter values, retraction is more effective when introduced
by the original, founding node. It is not entirely surprising. There are two advantages to
a central node issuing a retraction. First, as with the small-world networks, there is an
advantage of a retraction coming from the same place because it can chase the same paths
the false belief took. Second, there is a benefit when the retraction is issued by a highly
connected node, with relatively short paths to the rest of the network. Figure 11 shows
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these results for different values of m. Note that when m is low, there is relatively little false
belief because the sparse network structure impairs its spread. In all cases, there is a clear
benefit to retraction from the original node.
Figure 11: False beliefs are less prevalent when a central node issues a retraction of its own
falsehood, rather than when a relatively less central node does. N = 100, Delay=100, time
frame for sharing = 200
3.4. Homophilic Networks
Sometimes populations fracture into political camps or research communities that take differ-
ent approaches. Such networks are especially relevant to thinking about failures of retraction,
since retractions accepted by one subgroup may be ignored by another.
To consider this sort of case, we look at how homophily affects the persistence of retracted
information. Network homophily describes the tendency for nodes that are ‘similar’ in some
respect (i.e., in-groups) to be more likely to attach to one another than ‘dissimilar’ (i.e., out-
group) nodes. Because of this tendency, in homophilic networks, we see highly connected
subgroups with relatively fewer connections between. Figure 12 shows an example.
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Figure 12: Example of a network exhibiting homophily. Each subpopulation has N = 50
agents. The probability that a particular individual has a connection with a member of her
in-group is significantly higher than the probability that she has a connection with a member
of her out-group. In this case, pin = 0.25 and pout = 0.10, respectively.
There are two reasons we examine homophilic networks. First, we see subgroups of this
sort in many real-world networks, including scientific communities.16 Additionally, social
networks surrounding political orientation are often homophilic (Himelboim et al., 2016).
Second, by splitting the population into subgroups, we can examine the effect that distinct
sources of information have on the persistence of false information in the population as a
whole and within each subpopulation.
We always assume that for N individuals, each subpopulation consists of N/2 individuals.
For each individual, ni, in the network, there is some probability, pin, that ni is connected
with a given member of her in-group, and there is some other probability, pout, that ni is
paired with a member of her out-group. In Figure 12, for example, pin = 0.25 and pout = 0.10.
What happens in models with homophily? General results are similar to those reported.
Compared to the model with a complete network, retracted beliefs tend to spread less quickly
16For example, among medical researchers in the United States, there is a sharp divide between those who
believe that ‘chronic Lyme disease’—i.e., a form of the disease that resists short-term antibiotic treatment—
is a fiction and those who report efficacy of long-term antibiotics to relieve symptoms (O’Connor and
Weatherall, 2019).
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in homophilic networks, meaning that on average neutral and false beliefs persist longer, and
in models with timed novelty fewer individuals ever reach retracted beliefs.
In cases with a high level of homophily between the groups, we find that retractions are
less successful when introduced in the group that did not generate the original false belief.
This is unsurprising since homophily means that it takes longer for false beliefs to reach the
other group, making retraction less relevant and more likely to stop spreading.17 Once the
retraction does manage to spread, there are fewer links by which it can travel to the group
that originated the false belief. Figure 13 shows this.
Figure 13: Homophilic networks may have more persistent false belief when retraction is
introduced to a different partition from where it originated. pin = 0.4, pout = 0.004, N = 100,
timed novelty stops after 200 rounds
Additionally, both the location of the original false belief and the location of the retraction
can influence the relative levels of false belief in the two subgroups. For simplicity, let us
call the groups 1 and 2. We assume the false belief is always introduced in group 1, and the
retraction can be introduced in either. In most cases, group 1 tends to hold false beliefs for
more extended periods than 2, since the false belief originated in their area of the network.
17Perhaps more surprising is that we see little effect for lower levels of homophily. We are not sure why
only extreme homophily values exhibit these tendencies.
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Though in cases where both the false belief and the retraction show up in group 1, it
will sometimes be the case that the false belief, but not the retraction, manages to spread
effectively to group 2. In such cases, more members of group 1 will hold the false belief at
some time or another, but they’ll also learn the retraction faster. When the retraction is
introduced in group 2, though, group 1 holds false beliefs for longer in all models. If the
individuals with the incorrect belief do not receive a correction in their own subgroup, they
are left in a state of false belief as the retraction slowly trickles back to them. Figure 14
shows data supporting these claims. We report average end beliefs for groups 1 and 2, for
cases where the retraction is introduced in 1 (same) and 2 (other). When the retraction is
in the same subgroup, that group ends up with many more retracted beliefs; and, for these
parameter values, shorter average false beliefs. When the retraction is introduced in group
2, group 1 has dramatically higher levels of false belief and lower levels of retracted beliefs.
Figure 14: Average length of belief for two subgroups in a homophilic network. Results are
for group 1 and group 2, for cases where the retraction is introduced in the same subgroup
(1) and the other subgroup (2). pin = 0.4, pout = 0.004, N = 100, Delay=400, timed novelty
stops after 200 rounds
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4. Conclusion
To summarise our findings: we find that contagion-type models are a useful tool in exploring
the dynamics of retraction. They show why false beliefs can persist indefinitely, even in
light of a retraction, when agents stop sharing new beliefs. They illustrate how delays might
influence the success of a retraction, including the surprising finding that in some cases delay
might improve the saturation of a retraction. They show how network structure can impact
the success of retraction, and, in particular, how retractions are less successful when they do
not come from the original source. In homophilic networks, retractions are more successful
when they originate in the same group as the false claim.
Simplified models like the ones we present here must always be treated carefully when
applied to real-world cases. In particular, there are mismatches between model and target
in our work that may attenuate the relevance of the results. We will now talk about a few
of these mismatches before outlining in greater detail what we think these models can do.
One of these gaps is that we do not model prominent, or central communicating agents
such as a journal, or academic search engine, that spread ideas to large portions of a popu-
lation at once. One might worry that in science authors will always check with these sorts of
central agents before adopting a new belief, or citing a source, thus invalidating our models.
Empirically, though, we know that this does not always happen. Instead, authors often pull
citations directly from citing papers, rather than looking to the original source (Broadus,
1983). Moreover, as we made clear earlier in the paper, the existence of these central agents
does not seem to stop the widespread citation of retracted work. Still, this kind of structure
should impact the flow of information in scientific communities, and below we will discuss
this further.
Another issue relates to the representation of agents’ cognition. Our agents have only
three belief states—neutral, false, or retracted. However, in many cases, results of scientific
studies are not easily deemed to be true or false but are controversial. For this reason, as
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noted above, the models will not apply to a wide range of cases where beliefs vary in degree.
Additionally, the agents in our populations have none of the special reasoning biases humans
exhibit. Thus, there are no instances of, e.g., confirmation bias, where individuals seek out
all and only ‘facts’ that support their beliefs. They do not yield to conformist bias—i.e.,
imitating the beliefs of neighbours for social reasons. Further work might look at whether
the results here hold up under more complex representations of agents.
Our models also assume that agents are not motivated to shape the beliefs of those
around them. Whenever agents learn that a piece of information is false, they stop sharing
it and start sharing the retraction. However, it seems scientists often continue to cite and
share their own retracted findings. Madlock-Brown and Eichmann (2015) show this is a
common practice and that scientists who do it boost their post-retraction citation count.
One reason for this may be that scientists often seek credit—attention and good reputation
from those in the community (Merton, 1973).
Scientific journals and research institutions are also incentivised to maintain both read-
ership and reputation, which may make them both reluctant to retract papers and to com-
municate these retractions to readers (Unger and Couzin, 2006; Wager and Williams, 2011;
Madlock-Brown and Eichmann, 2015). For instance, there seem to be many cases in which
journal retractions are overly vague, or imply an error, when, in fact, they were the result
of discovered fraud (Wager and Williams, 2011; Fang et al., 2012).18 Many philosophers
of science have used Merton’s framework to model scientists as taking part in a ‘credit
economy’ (Kitcher, 1990; Bright, 2017; Heesen, 2018). A next version of our model might
include credit motivations as well as epistemic motivations for our agents. In other cases,
retracted information is shared by those with political or economic motivations. We might
also consider agents who seek to shape the landscape of belief.19
18News sources may do the same thing. Writing about news retractions, Craig Silverman reports that
news sources often try to downplay the fact that they were wrong (McWilliams, 2013).
19Philosophers of science have successfully used network-epistemology models to investigate situations
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Despite the limitations of these models, there are several appropriate takeaways. First,
they are useful for hypothesis-generation and directing further empirical research. This is
especially true for cases where empirical work is lacking, such as in the case of uptake of
media retractions. To give an example: our results suggest that moderate delays in retraction
may sometimes make them more effective. Although this is not an obvious hypothesis to test
prior to this modelling work, it is worth examining given the theoretical support generated
here. It is also worth considering how the location of a retraction in real networks influences
outcomes. Does the source matter, especially in homophilic groups, as we suggest?
Second, the models here provide tools for thinking about how to improve current systems
to make retractions more effective. (Improvements that can be empirically tested.) What
solutions do they suggest? We cannot easily alter the network connections between human
individuals, laboratories, or research institutes. Additionally, we probably cannot convince
agents to keep talking about retractions for a longer period than they usually would. How-
ever, we might be able to institute changes for central communicators like those mentioned
above—journals and academic search engines. Imagine the addition of a node into our net-
work models that communicates with a large proportion of the population and continues to
share information about the retraction actively and indefinitely. Such a node would move
the population towards something like the networks we discussed first, where falsehood is
always eventually stamped out. If each individual is connected to a node that continues to
share the retraction, they should eventually get that information.
This also implies that real organisations should be more active about communicating
retractions. For instance, in searching Google scholar, it is easy to yield retracted research
papers as results without also seeing the retraction. A better practice would involve tying
these search results together. Journals should implement editorial policies that check to see
whether cited sources have been retracted, and then ask authors to remove these sources
like this (Holman and Bruner, 2015, 2017; Weatherall et al., 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2019).
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where appropriate. This would, in effect, be a policy designed to promote continued and
widespread sharing of the retraction.
Our results also suggest it is important for retractions to be spread by the same sources
that originated a false belief. If a refutation is published in another field or subfield, it might
not be effective. The journal that originally published the false result should publicize this
refutation to their own readers. Likewise, if a news source proves that another is wrong, it
is important that the original news source share this information as well. Journalists who,
for instance, publicise false claims should try to use the same venues to clarify matters.
In sum, while these models are highly simplified, they are useful in directing further
research into retraction. In particular, they help yield hypotheses regarding network structure
and community design that may help improve retraction and the elimination of false beliefs.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1: For any connected network, a population configuration is stable
if and only if no individual holds a false belief.
Proof. (⇐) Assume that no individual in the population holds a false belief. Then
every individual in the population either has neutral information or retracted
information.
On a particular trial, we pair two individuals, A and B. Either A and B have
the same information, or they have different information. If they have the same
information—both neutral or both retracted—then they do not update, so the
state-configuration remains unchanged. This leaves the case where they have
different information. Without loss of generality, assume that A holds a neutral
belief, and B holds a retracted belief. In this case, ex hypothesi, they do not share
information. Therefore, the state configuration remains unchanged.
(⇒) We proceed via the contrapositive.
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Assume at least one individual in the population holds false information. By as-
sumption, at least one individual in the network holds a retracted belief. Because
the network is connected, there is at least one path of vertices connecting these
individuals. On every round, there is a positive probability that any two neigh-
bours meet. Thus, from any starting time step, in the limit, all neighbours on
this path will be selected to meet with probability 1. Consider moving down the
path from the individual with false belief. If the individual with false belief has
a neighbour with neutral or retracted belief, the configuration is thus not stable.
If their neighbour has a false belief, but if the next neighbour has a neutral or
retracted belief, the configuration is not stable, etc. Since the final node on the
path holds the retracted belief, the sub-network consisting in this path is not
stable, and thus the entire network is not in a stable configuration.
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